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ABSTRACT
I argue against Barbara Montero’s claim that Conservation of Energy (CoE) 
has nothing to do with physicalism. I reject her reconstruction of the argument 
for physicalism from CoE, and offer instead an alternative reconstruction 
that better captures the intuitions of those who believe that there is a conflict 
between interactionist dualism and CoE.
INTRODUCTION
In “What Does the Conservation of Energy Have to Do with Physicalism?” 
Barbara Montero observes that many philosophers “hold that the conservation 
of energy law is inconsistent with interactive dualism”, an inconsistency they 
take to “lead to an argument for physicalism” (2006, 385). Montero argues, 
however, that no valid argument against interactionism can be constructed 
without also taking on board, as extra premises, contentious claims about 
causation and the nature of entities that have energy.1 Although the argument 
that results is valid, Conservation of Energy (CoE) becomes a redundant 
premise in it, and the title question of her paper must be answered with 
“nothing whatsoever” (395).
I agree with Montero that arguments for physicalism (or against 
interactionism) anchored in CoE are seldom carefully enunciated, and that 
reconstructing and evaluating these arguments is important. Although I 
must leave the discussion of that point for another occasion, I also take 
the argument from CoE to the falsity of interactionism to be inconclusive. 
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1 I will often speak as if Montero considers an argument against interactionism, even 
though she mostly frames the discussion in terms of an argument in favour of physicalism. 
This inaccuracy is inconsequential since—on the premise that there are causal relations 
between the mental and the physical, a premise which figures in all the arguments Montero 
considers—an argument for physicalism is also an argument against interactionism.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that Montero’s case for the outright irrelevance of 
CoE to interactionism does not succeed. Her argument does not adequately 
account for the intuitions that motivate the incompatibility claim, and it is 
therefore an unsatisfactory response to it.
In what follows, I briefly summarise Montero’s argument and discuss 
the role of causation and closure in her argument. I propose an alternative 
interpretation of the notion of closure and present a plausible and valid 
argument against interactionism in which CoE figures non-redundantly. 
PURPORTED IRRELEVANCE
Montero spends some time justifying her reconstruction of the argument for 
physicalism from CoE. Reconstructed in the preferred “general form” (388), 
the “Argument from the Conservation of Energy” (ACE) appears as follows:
1. Energy is conserved in any closed system.
2. The universe is a closed system.
3. There are causal relations between the mental and the physical.
4. Causation involves the transference of energy.
Thus: The mental is physical (385).
To make the argument conclusive, Montero points out that another premise 
has to be added: “anything with energy is physical” (393). When this last 
premise is appended, however, the first two premises are no longer needed 
to establish the conclusion. With the first two premises subtracted, and the 
remaining premises appropriately renumbered, we get what Montero calls the 
“Real Argument for Physicalism” (RAP): 
1. There are causal relations between the mental and the physical. 
2. Causation involves the transference of energy.
3. Anything with energy is physical.
Thus: The mental is physical (394).
This argument, which according to Montero “lies behind the supposed 
argument for physicalism from the conservation of energy”, is valid, but CoE 
is, of course, conspicuously absent from it (394). So, Montero concludes, CoE 
turns out to be “irrelevant to the question of whether the mental is physical” 
(395).
CAUSATION
Call a person who claims that interactionism is incompatible with CoE, 
and therefore false, an incompatibilist. It is plausible that the incompatibilist 
reasons in something like the following manner: “The physical world 
conserves energy. Therefore, if the dualist is right and the mind is outside 
the physical world, the mind is outside a system that conserves energy. If the 
mind then interacts with the brain, its interaction will violate conservation. But 
we know that conservation is not violated. So the mind cannot be outside the 
physical world and still interact with it.”
As Montero points out, incompatibilist arguments are hard to find in 
explicit form. When considering the incompatibilist case, we are therefore 
left to reconstruct an argument on the incompatibilist’s behalf. An obvious 
desideratum of such a reconstruction is that it should accommodate the 
intuitions the reasoning relies on, by giving them a central part to play in the 
argument against interactionism.
According to Montero, this cannot be done. She claims that there is 
no plausible and valid argument for physicalism in which CoE figures non-
redundantly, and also that the argument which is really doing the work 
depends inter alia on the (contentious) claim that causation involves transfer 
of energy. 
I reject both these claims. By way of backing up my rejection of 
the former claim, I provide below a plausible and valid argument against 
interactionism in which CoE figures non-redundantly, and which accounts for 
the incompatibilist’s intuitions. But first I wish to motivate my rejection of the 
latter claim.
It is very implausible that the argument for physicalism from CoE 
should depend on the transference theory of causation, because it seems 
to go through perfectly well on a counterfactual theory. To make this vivid, 
consider the following thought experiment:
Imagine a non-physical omnipotent being. If such a being exists, it can 
bring something about in any logically possible manner whatever. The way it 
chooses to bring something about might be so alien to us that we should be 
forced to characterise the event as miraculous or, perhaps, magical. Suppose 
that the being uses its powers to move a single particle in a brain from one 
location to another. Then, the incompatibilist will argue, it is very likely that the 
energy-level of the brain after this occurred would be different to from what it 
was before. Then CoE has been violated. 
This highlights the point that it is the end result—the change in the 
brain—that matters, and not the mechanism by which that change is brought 
about. The crucial ability attributed to the omnipotent being is the ability 
to cause a particle to move without this necessitating that the changes we 
usually observe in adjacent physical systems (changes in energy that are, in 
sum, equal, but of opposite sign) occur as well. Interactionism holds that the 
mind has that ability.2
Interactionism claims that changes in the brain depend counterfactually 
on changes in the mind. Suppose that interactionism is true, and that because 
of the mind a particle in the brain moves when it otherwise would not have. 
Then, the incompatibilist will argue, it is very likely that the mind has changed 
the energy-level of the brain, and that CoE has therefore been violated. But 
CoE is never violated. So changes in the brain are very unlikely to depend 
counterfactually on the mind, and interactionism is very likely false. That this 
line of argument is open to the incompatibilist shows that the counterfactual 
theory of causation is quite enough to get an argument from CoE against 
interactionism started.3 
CLOSURE
Before constructing a plausible and valid argument for physicalism in which 
CoE figures non-redundantly, we must consider how a crucial notion should 
be understood. CoE says that in any closed system, energy is conserved. The 
latter of the two italicised terms is not too hard to define; energy is conserved in 
a system if the total quantity of energy in the system is unchanged over time, 
if “there is at every moment in time the same total amount of energy” (Dieks 
1986, 90). But what is it for a system to be closed?
Montero’s interpretation of this notion plays a crucial role in her 
argument for the claim that there is no plausible and valid argument for 
physicalism in which CoE figures non-redundantly. She writes:
[T]he notion of being a closed system here is distinct from the notion of being 
causally closed as it is used in the [causal] argument for physicalism ... [where] the 
physical world is said to be causally closed, roughly, if every physical effect that has 
a sufficient cause has a sufficient physical cause. Here, ‘a closed system’ means that 
the system neither affects nor is affected by anything from outside of it (385, n. 12).
An important part of the intuition driving the incompatibilist is almost 
certainly that if the dualist is right, the mind lies outside a conservative system. 
Montero contests this. Her argument proceeds in two steps.
In the first step, Montero argues that the incompatibilist cannot 
suppose that the physical world is closed in the sense required by CoE. 
3 Not only is the transference theory of causation unnecessary to get the argument off 
the ground, but its inclusion seems to make the argument prove too much. As Montero 
acknowledges, an argument against interactionism in which the transference theory of 
causation forms part is also an argument against epiphenomenalism. That conclusion 
runs contrary to the received view of what epiphenomenalism entails. As the quotations in 
Montero’s paper illustrate (384), proponents of the incompatibility claim do not worry that 
energy would “disappear” if epiphenomenalism were true, and epiphenomenalists typically do 
not take the brain to have to expend energy to give rise to the mind. Campbell, for example, 
says in regards to “the production of spiritual effects by material causes” that “it is no part of 
the conservation principle that the production of non-material effects requires physical energy” 
(1970/1980, 53).
Given her notion of closure the reason is obvious: claiming that the physical 
world were closed in her sense would be to beg the question outright against 
interactionist dualism. If the physical world is not affected by anything outside 
of it, and if the mind is not physical, it follows that the mind does not affect 
anything in the physical world. Then interactionism is false. To avoid begging 
the question, Montero argues that the only system the incompatibilist can 
suppose is closed is the universe as a whole: the system of all there is, 
physical or non-physical (386).
Which systems are closed in this sense and which conserve energy 
are two separate questions. Perhaps the incompatibilist could argue that 
though the only closed system is the whole universe, there is a conservative 
sub-system to be found. In particular, could the incompatibilist claim that the 
physical sub-system is conservative? If the mind was thought to be inside 
the closed system but outside the conservative one, an argument against 
interactionism could still get off the ground. In the second step Montero 
argues that the empirical evidence can only legitimately be taken as evidence 
for the claim that energy is conserved in the whole of the closed system and 
not as evidence for the claim that energy is conserved in the physical sub-
system.4 That seals the case. If the mind is not only inside the closed system 
but inside the conservative system as well, no valid argument for physicalism 
can be advanced on the basis of CoE without denying that the mind has 
energy of its own. If it does, its participation in causal transactions could 
still conserve energy. This leads to the conclusion that the real argument 
for physicalism has as its premises the claims that mind and body interact 
causally, that causation involves transference of energy, and that anything 
with energy is physical.
4 I find her argument unconvincing (more on this later).
Since, as we have just seen, Montero’s notion of closure plays an 
integral role in the argument for the claim that there is no plausible argument 
for physicalism in which CoE plays a non-redundant part, it is reasonable to 
look for an alternative interpretation of the notion. But what should it be?
For the purposes of CoE, the standard interpretation of closure has it 
that a closed system is such that energy does not flow or is not transferred into 
or out of it (Dowe 2000, 95; Halliday et al. 1997, 167). Call such a system 
an e–closed system. One indication that e–closure is the right notion is that 
it yields a result that accords well with the “slogan version” of the law. The 
slogan version says that energy is neither created nor destroyed, or that it 
“cannot magically appear or disappear” (Halliday et al. 1997, 168). If a system 
is e–closed—if it has energy-tight borders—and if energy is neither created 
nor destroyed within it, then the total quantity of energy within the system 
will remain unchanged, which is what CoE claims. So e–closure is a good 
candidate notion.
There is, however, a complication.5 Imagine an experiment examining 
a purportedly e–closed system revealing that energy has been transferred 
to an entity in the system from an entity outside the system. The correct 
conclusion to draw from this would be that the system was not e–closed after 
all. On the other hand, the discovery that the energy level of an entity inside 
the system just rose would rightly be taken as a case of an e–closed system 
where energy was not conserved, and would therefore constitute a violation of 
CoE. The distinction between the two cases seems to rely on energy being 
identifiable and re-identifiable through time. If there is no way to determine 
that this ‘bit’ of energy is the same as that, the two outcomes would seem to 
be indistinguishable from one another: we would be unable to distinguish a 
situation where the law’s application condition failed to obtain from a counter-
5 I am grateful to Toby Handfield for bringing this to my attention.
instance to the law.6
However, the suggestion that energy has identity over time appears 
to be in dissonance with current physical theory (Dowe 2000, 55-59; 
Dieks 1986, 87-91). Dowe, for example, concludes that “energy generally 
doesn’t have identity through time” (59), and Dieks states that “the idea that 
energy ... possess[es] an identity of [its] own which is retained throughout 
physical interactions is already foreign to classical physics”, and in quantum 
mechanics “[t]he mere ascription of an identity to the energy elements ... 
entails consequences which are observably wrong (88, 89). It therefore 
seems that we may be forced either to relinquish the use of e–closure in the 
formulation of CoE, or else to conclude that CoE is immune, in a particular 
way, to counterexamples, raising questions about its substantiveness.
Despite this, I think there are good reasons to retain the notion of e–
closure and the formulation of CoE of which it forms part. First, even if this 
particular formulation of e–closure must be relinquished, it is not clear that 
another cannot be put in its place that retains its use in CoE. Dieks has 
suggested a mathematically defined current of energy that does not rely on 
energy being identified. With this notion e–closure can be restated in terms 
of the absence of incoming or outgoing currents.7 Second, e–closure enables 
the formation of an argument which accounts for the incompatibilist’s intuitions 
and preserves the relevance of CoE. So there is good reason to think that, 
6 It has been suggested to me (by an anonymous referee) that if the description of the latter 
case were amended to include that a closely neighbouring system lost roughly as much 
energy as the purportedly closed system had gained, we would be justified in inferring 
that it was not closed after all. I have worries about this suggestion that I see no reason to 
discuss here; it suffices to note that if this is correct the notion of e-closure does not depend 
on identification and re-identification of energy, and so the argument I offer below is not 
threatened by the complication under consideration.
7 “We can consider energy and momentum densities as functions of space and time 
coordinates and we can calculate the changes of the densities if we vary the values of 
these coordinates. This gives us a rate of change in every direction. In this way we can 
mathematically define a ‘current’ of energy and momentum. In view of the conservation laws 
the total ‘current’ for an isolated system must vanish” (90).
at least when reconstructing an argument on the incompatibilist’s behalf, e–
closure, or a notion very much like it, should be employed. In what follows I 
assume that a closed system can be defined either in terms of flow or transfer 
of energy, or in terms of some closely related notion that does the same job.
RELEVANCE REASSERTED
I claimed above that Montero’s strategy fails to adequately account for the 
intuitions that are likely to be central in motivating the incompatibilist. One of 
these is that, according to the dualist, the mind lies outside a conservative system. 
Another is that if it does, the mind’s interaction with the conservative system would 
violate conservation. Once the notion of closure in CoE is understood as e-
closure it becomes possible to construct an argument in which both these 
intuitions play a role: 
1* Energy is conserved in any e–closed system (assumption).
2* The physical world is an e–closed system (assumption).
3* If a non-physical mind changes a physical system, it changes its 
energy-level (assumption).
4* If the energy-level of a physical system is changed by a non-physical 
system, energy is not conserved in the physical world (assumption).
5* Therefore: It is not the case that a non-physical mind changes a 
physical system. 8
1* and 2* take care of the intuition that if dualism is true, the mind is 
outside a conservative system. Dualism holds that the mind is not a part of 
the physical world, and from 1* and 2* it follows that the physical world is 
conservative. In turn, 3* and 4* jointly express the incompatibilist’s second 
central intuition, that the interaction of a non-physical mind with a conservative 
system would violate conservation.9
8 Many thanks to David Chalmers and Toby Handfield for very helpful suggestions on this 
argument.
9 That is, they do on the assumption that the changes mentioned in the antecedent of 4* are 
sufficient to cause downstream behavioural consequences, an assumption left implicit here.
Note that 1* is just CoE, on what I have argued is the best way to 
understand a closed system. 2* is a substantive assumption, but it is one we 
can expect the incompatibilist to be happy to make, and unlike the claim that 
the physical world is closed in Montero’s sense, 2* does not beg the question 
against interactionism.
Montero uses a distinction between two interpretations of CoE to argue 
that the claim that energy is conserved in the physical world is not supported 
by our evidence. The “principle of physical conservation” (386) holds that 
energy is conserved among the physical components of the closed system, 
whereas the unrestricted version makes no such qualification. She goes on to 
claim that “while physics gives us reason to believe the [unrestricted version], 
it does not seem to give us reason to believe [physical conservation]” (386). 
By way of backing this up, Montero argues that restricted version 
cannot be accepted “without question” while the unrestricted version can, 
because the former is “a philosophical principle rather than a law of physics” 
(387-88). It seems to me, however, that any evidence we have for CoE is 
evidence for the restricted version, but not for the unrestricted one, and that 
CoE regards the physical components of a system. 
Montero considers this possibility: “One might argue that as all close 
observations that support the conservation of energy have been of entirely 
physical systems, all of our evidence for the conservation of energy is also 
evidence for physical conservation” (388, emphasis mine). She goes on to 
object that “when evidence for a theory is consistent with another theory ... [it 
does not follow that] the other theory is justified by this evidence” (388). 
This objection seems to get things the wrong way around. The question 
is not whether the evidence is also evidence for the restricted version of 
CoE; given that the experimental evidence in favour of CoE has resulted 
from observations of entirely physical systems, it is the generalisation to the 
unrestricted version of CoE that is unwarranted by our observations. The 
evidence we have for CoE is only evidence for the restricted version.
It is perfectly true, of course, as Montero points out, that an experiment 
with mind-body interaction which showed that energy was not conserved 
among the physical components of the system would provide a counter-
example to the restricted version of CoE but not to the unrestricted version, 
since one could then stipulate that energy was conserved in the entire 
system, but not in the physical subsystem. But that does not show that the 
unrestricted version of CoE is what is supported by our present evidence; it 
just shows that CoE is not as well established as some might have thought 
that it is, since it has not been tested in the full range of circumstances. At 
least insofar as CoE is an empirical, a posteriori discovery, it is shown to be 
a thesis about the physical part of a system by the evidence adduced in its 
favour.10
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The reconstructed argument is not an argument for physicalism, since 
epiphenomenalist dualism is compatible with its conclusion. It is an argument 
against interactionist dualism. But it is not a knock-down argument. An 
obvious way to reject it is to claim that the mind causes changes in the brain 
exclusively by reconfiguring it in such a way that its level of energy is not 
changed.11 If that is true, 3* is false and the argument fails.12
Can a non-knock-down argument against interactionism show that 
CoE is relevant to physicalism? It can. If the four premises are accepted, the 
reconstructed argument can be made into an argument for physicalism by the 
addition of a premise to the effect that the mind changes the body and the 
10 I am grateful to Jessica Wilson for convincing me that this sentence should be conditional.
11 See e.g. (Campbell 1970/1980, 52-53; Broad 1925, 103-09). 
12 There are also promising strategies for resisting the argument that depend on rejecting 
the final premise, but since it is not here my concern to consider how an interactionist should 
respond to the argument, discussing these options would take me too far afield.
body changes the mind, a premise accepted by all but a few philosophers. 
And even if 3* is rejected in the way just outlined, CoE is still relevant to 
physicalism. The vast majority of changes that can be made to a physical 
system will change its energy-level, so the set of reconfigurations that do 
not change the energy-level of the brain is small compared to the set of 
changes that do. Rejecting 3* therefore places a significant constraint on the 
interactionist theory. Since interactionist dualism is one of its most important 
competitors, this ensures CoE’s relevance to physicalism.
The argument I have presented is valid, it accounts for the 
incompatibilist’s central intuitions, and CoE forms an integral part of it. 
Neither the transference theory of causation nor the claim that anything with 
energy is physical figure in it. Those two claims are both more general than is 
required. The question of whether the mind has energy, and the question of 
whether causation between two physical systems or events always involves 
transference of energy are both beside the point. What matters for the 
purposes of an argument from CoE is just that mental–physical causation 
is not characterised by energy-transfer. The premise which states that the 
physical world is an e–closed system ensures that that is true.13 
For all these reasons, the argument presented above is a much more 
reasonable reconstruction on behalf of the incompatibilist than is RAP. It 
does not show that the truth of CoE ultimately proves interactionism false. 
But it does show that CoE is relevant both to interactionist dualism and to 
physicalism.
13 Another way to resist the argument is, of course, to deny that the physical world is e–
closed, by supposing that the mind has energy of its own. But just as before, this restricts the 
interactionist theory significantly, and therefore certainly ensures the relevance of CoE.
∗ Many thanks to John Bigelow, David Chalmers, Ian Gold, Toby Handfield, Graham Oppy, 
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